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ARTICLES
USE OF THE COMPARATIVE METHOD BY
THE COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE
EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES
C. N. Kakouris
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Comparative Research - Notion
In view of the varying opinions concerning the goals of the
comparative method,1 it is necessary to briefly set out the au-
thor's views on the subject for the purpose of this article.
The law is an object of knowledge for the jurist. It is also an
object of knowledge for the sociologist (as well as the historian,
the psychologist, the politician etc.). The jurist determines
what is in force, a concrete rule or a whole legal order. Sociolo-
gists and others seek out causes by determining why a rule was
introduced or why a legal order took a particular form. The so-
called "unwritten law" is also an object of knowledge for jurists.
It only becomes an object of knowledge for the sociologist and
the others once it has been transposed into written "Judge
made" law.
For methodological reasons, the subject of knowledge must
always clearly distinguish whether they are acting as jurist or
as sociologist. Jurists know that, in order to acquire a thorough
understanding of the law, they should comprehend the law from
both points of view: they should know what rule has been intro-
duced and also why it was introduced. However, it is not al-
ways necessary for them to have knowledge of both of these
views. It is usually sufficient for an administrative authority,
as well as a court, to know that a rule is in force in order to
1 G. Benos, The Practical Debt of Community Law to Comparative Law, RE-
VUE HELLENIQUE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 241 (1984).
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apply it, with no need in principle to know why that particular
rule was introduced.
A specialists in modern comparative law do not confine
themselves to what jurists normally do; namely finding out
what is in force in each legal system with regard to a particular
"subject-matter"2 and then comparing the differences between
the systems. The jurist first determines the set of socio-politico-
economic relations which make up the "subject-matter." As a
result, the jurist's approach is not entirely free from the ele-
ments inherent in a sociological approach. 3
2 1 shall not consider the distinction between the micro-comparative and
macro-comparative methods, since I feel that the micro-comparative method (com-
parison of the solutions adopted by different laws for a specific question) must
never be considered alone, without reference to the macro-comparative method
(comparison between the various legal orders considered in their entirety). With
regard to those two methods, see P. DORIS, MICRO-ECONOMIC RESEARCH AND ITS
UTILITY IN THE INTERPRETATION OF GREEK PRIVATE LAW 609, NoB (1983) (Greek).
This distinction corresponds to the distinction between the analytical research and
synthetic research of P. Pescatore, Le Recours Dans la Jurisprudence de las Cour a
Des Normes Deduites de la Comparison des Droits des Etats Membres, REvUE IN-
TERNATIONALE DE DROrr COMPARE [R.I.D.C.] 352 (1980).
3 The concept of the "comparative method" described in section 1, subsection
A constitutes the point of departure for this article. I shall not consider the
problems associated with defining that concept. However, for the sake of clarity, it
is necessary to view it in contradistinction to the following related concepts:
(a) Comparisons between the institutions and provisions of one and the same legal
order fall outside the sphere of comparative law. For example, an argument as-
serting that when a legislature expressly said so in another related law and says
nothing in the law to be interpreted means that it did not wish to say so in the
latter, does not form part of the comparative method.
(b) A comparison of a new provision to be interpreted with a previous provision,
with a view to educing an argument a contrario, does not form part of the compara-
tive method.
(c) Reference to the historical origin of a principle or a provision, as made in the
judgment of 25 February 1969 in Case 23/58, Klomp v. Inspektie Der Balastingen,
1969 E.C.R. 43, para. 13, which held that the principle of continuity of the legal
system when legislation is amended can be traced back to Roman law (see D.1.3.26
and 28), does not form part of the comparative method.
(d) Simultaneous reference by the Court to the three Treaties establishing the Eu-
ropean Communities, and recourse to interpretative arguments based on their ul-
timate common objective, does not constitute an application of the comparative
method. The three Treaties are the TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COAL
AND STEEL CoMMuNITY [ECSC TREATY], the TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN
ECoNOMIC CoMMUNITY [EEC TREATY], and the TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EuRo-
PEAN ATOMIC ENERGY COMMUNITY [EURATOM TREATY]. The Member States in April
1965 later signed the TREATY ESTABLISHING A SINGLE COUNCIL AND SINGLE COM-
MISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNmEs [MERGER TREATY] which unified the exec-
utive and legislative functions of the three prior treaties. The combination of these
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol6/iss2/2
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B. Use By the Legislator - By the Courts
The legislature and the courts use the findings of compara-
tive law differently. The legislature uses the findings derived
from modern comparative law as one of the many elements on
which to base its opinion de lege ferenda.4 In contrast, the
courts use comparative law as a method of interpreting the law
which is in force.
The results of judicial decisions are often similar to the re-
sults arrived at by the legislature. This is true not only in legal
systems based on the principle of stare decisis; this "judge-made
law" also exists in the other legal systems. However, there is
still a fundamental difference between the actions of the legisla-
ture and those of the courts. The legislature brings into force a
rule after considering its appropriateness. The courts interpret
vague notions or fill lacunae in written law by recourse to the
"unwritten law",5 which is already in force, by using a "cogni-
tive"6 approach. This difference in approach is not theoretical,
but real and fundamental.
In order to accomplish its mission, the Court of Justice also
uses the comparative method. The purpose of this article is to
make some observations on the use of the comparative method
by that Court.
C. Use By The Court of Justice - Legitimation
First, the Court uses comparative law as a method of inter-
pretation. "Interpretation" includes the filling of gaps in the
"written law" which is a "cognitive" process since it adds noth-
ing to the law in force, but merely transposes unwritten law
into written case-law.
treaties together is generally referred to as the European Community (EC). How-
ever, it is the EEC TREATY which is the most far-reaching and usually is applied
when matters fall within its scope.
(e) Examination of the wording of a text of Community legislation in the various
authentic official languages in the Community does not constitute an application of
the comparative method.
4 That is to say regarding the rule which it is appropriate to bring into force.
5 As regards the existence of unwritten law, we cannot fail to refer to Sopho-
cles's Antigone, verses 456 and 457, "unwritten and unmutable laws of the gods...
not only today or yesterday but eternally, . . . are living laws and no one knows
when they appeared." (Original ancient Greek text omitted, Eds.)
6 See also discussion infra part II.C.
19941
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At this point, the question arises as to what legal basis
gives authority to the Court's use of the comparative method.
Succinctly, there is no express general 7 provision which autho-
rizes this use by the Court, although there is an exception., For
the rest, in conjunction with the preamble to the Treaty and
Article 2, the Court's authority is based on Article 164 of the EC
Treaty9 which sets out the aims of the Community concerning
the Brussels Convention, 10 in which the Court's authority is
founded in Article 5 of the Protocol on the Interpretation of the
Convention by the Court, in conjunction with Article 164.
II. THE COMPARATIVE METHOD AND THE COURT
A. Comparison Necessary By Virtue of Community Law
The second paragraph of Article 215 of the EEC Treaty pro-
vides that the Community must, "in accordance with the gen-
eral principles common to the laws of the Member States" make
good any damage caused by its institutions or its servants.11
That specific reference has not prompted the Court to resort to
any sort of "mechanistic"' 2 interpretation. The rule which con-
stitutes the highest common denominator is usually,' 3 but not
necessarily, followed. The Court may choose the most appropri-
ate rule, and according to certain authors, it may do so even
where the appropriate rule is followed by only one Member
State. However, a common denominator is not easily found
7 See Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, art.
38(1)(c).
8 See discussion infra part II.A.
9 TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC CoMMUNITY [EEC TREATY]
art. 164. Article 164 states, "The Court of Justice shall ensure that in the interpre-
tation and application of this Treaty the law is observed." See also corresponding
Articles 31 and 136 of the ECEC TREATY and EuRATOM TREATY respectively. For
the sake of simplicity, from now on reference shall be made only of the EEC
TREATY.
10 Convention of 27 September 1968 on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of
Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, 1990 O.J. (C 189) 25.
11 EEC TREATY art. 215.
12 "Arithmetical" is the word used by Advocate General Lagrange in his Opin-
ion in Case 14/61, Hoogovens v. High Authority of the European Coal & Steel Com-
munity, 1962 E.C.R. 253.
13 For example, the judgment in Joined Cases 56-60/74, Kampffmeyer v.
Comm'n and Council of European Communities, 1976 E.C.R. 711, para. 6.
[Vol. 6:267
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol6/iss2/2
COMPARATIVE METHOD
either because of the diversity of national provisions 14 or the
absence of provisions concerning State liability to third
parties. 15
In fact, the principle exists in the Member States that no
liability arises from legislative measures, with reparation
granted only exceptionally. The sole occasion where reparation
is granted is where the legislative measures which caused the
damage includes such provisions of reparation. In most actions
for damages before the Court of Justice, arguments concerning
the illegality of regulations have been pleaded. The regulations
are the Community equivalent of statutory laws in the Member
States. As a result, the Court has upheld new rules in its case-
law.161n some instances, a comparative examination is required
by provision of secondary law.17
B. Comparison Necessary By Virtue of Obligations Under
Public International Law
The Court of Justice regards Community law as domestic
law of the Community and not as international law.' 8 Accord-
ing to the case-law of the Court, it follows that the general rules
of international law are not applicable to matters governed by
the Treaty, such as relations between the Member States, or
between the Community and the Member States. 19 Examples
of such general rules include the objection non adimpleti con-
14 Judgments in Case 68/79, Just v. Danish Ministry of Fiscal Affairs, 1980
E.C.R. 501, paras. 22-23: and Case 61/79, Amministrazione della Finanze dello
Stat v. Denkavit Italiana, 1980 E.C.R. 1205, para. 23. Those judgments did not
concern the second paragraph of Article 215.
15 See Judgment in Case 250/78, Deka v. European Economic Community,
1983 E.C.R. 421, para. 15.
16 See generally I. DELIGIANNIS, COMPARATIVE LAW AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
30 (1992) (Greek), and references therein.
17 Judgment in Case 110/75, Mills v. European Investment Bank, 1976 E.C.R.
955, para. 25 ("the general principles of the law of master and servant, to which
the last article of the staff regulations of the bank refers .... ").
18 This is mainly the reason why it does not, in interpreting the Treaty, use
the rules laid down in Articles 31 to 33 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties, 1969. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, arts. 31-
33, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 39127.
19 Judgement in Joined Cases 90 and 91/63, Luxembourg v. Belgium, 1964
E.C.R. 625. See also, Case 7/71, Comm'n v. France, 1971 E.R.C. 1003, para. 23.
1994]
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tractus, reciprocity, etc. 20 No instance of recourse to the com-
parative method by virtue of an international obligation of the
Community is to be found in the case-law of the Court of
Justice.
However, sometimes the Court, without being under an ob-
ligation to do so, draws from international law rules or princi-
ples which may facilitate the interpretation or filling of lacunae
in written Community law. Such cases are infrequent, but do
exist.21 In this context while the Court has not looked to the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, it has referred to the
European Convention on Human Rights, 22 as only one source of
inspiration among others.
C. Comparison Not Expressly Provided For - The EC Treaty
1. Legal Basis
The second paragraph of Article 215 cannot be interpreted
as excluding the use of the comparative method in the area of
non-contractual liability.23 The general competence of the
Court to use the comparative method is derived from Article
20 See A. Bredimas, Comparative Law in the Court of Justice of the European
Communities, YEARBOOK OF WORLD AFFAms 322 n.ll (1978) [hereinafter Compar-
ative Law]. See also Bredimas, Methods of Interpretation and Community Law, 6
Eu. STuD. L. (1978) [hereinafter Interpretation].
21 The judgement in Case 5/55, Assider v. High Authority of E.C.S.C., 1955
E.C.R. 135, para. 1.4 (In particular paragraph 1.4 refers to Article 60 of the Statute
of the International Court of Justice). See also Case 41/74, Van Duyn v. Home
Office, 1974 E.R.C. 1337, para. 22, which states "... . it is a principle of interna-
tional law, which the EEC Treaty cannot be presumed to disregard in relations
between member States.. ." (The matter in hand was not covered by the Treaty).
Case 374/87, Orkem v. Comm'n, 1989 E.R.C. 3283, paras. 30-31, refers to Article 6
of the European Human Rights Convention and to Article 14 of the International
Covenant. Case 92/71, Interfood GMBH v. Hauptzollamt Hamburg-ericus, 1972
E.R.C. 231, para. 6, which states, "Since agreements regarding the Common Cus-
toms Tariff were reached between the Community and its partners in GATT, the
principles underlying those agreements may be of assistance in interpreting the
rules of classification applicable to it." See also in relation to GATT, Case 266/81,
SIOT v. Ministero delle Finanze, et al., 1983 E.R.C. 731, Joined Cases 267-269/81,
Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v. SPI & SAMI, 1983 E.R.C. 801, and
Joined Cases 290 & 291/81, Singer & Geigy v. Amministrazione del Tesoro dello
Stato, 1983 E.R.C. 847. See Joined Cases 89, 104, 114, 116, 117 & 125-129/85,
Ahlstrom, et al. v. Comm'n, 1988 E.R.C. 5193, para. 18.
22 E.g., Case 4/73, Nold v. Comm'n of the European Communities, 1974 E.R.C.
491; Case 36/75, Rutili v. Minister for the Interior, 1975 E.R.C. 129.
23 On the contrary, the second paragraph of Article 215 offers an orientation
in favor of a widespread use of the comparative method, see supra note 7.
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol6/iss2/2
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164, which grants it very broad jurisdiction. Under Article 164,
"the Court of Justice shall ensure that in the implementation
and application of this Treaty the law is observed". 24 By virtue
of Article 164, the written law of the Treaty, which is supreme
among the provisions of Community law, has above it "the Idea
of Law", to use Plato's terminology. The Court must ensure ob-
servance of that Law. "The Idea of Law" must guide the Court
as the polar star guides sailors, to use Stammler's beautiful
imagery.
In order to perform this mission, the Court may25 use the
comparative method, thereby examining the laws not only of
the Member States but also those of non-member countries. In-
deed, the Court uses the comparative method frequently.
2. Teleological Interpretation and The Comparative Method
The comparative method is in the service of teleological in-
terpretation. 26 The Court constantly uses teleological interpre-
tation. This interpretative method seeks to apprehend the
meaning of law in the light of its purpose, its "teko~s". When a
specific provision is being examined, for example, one forming
part of a regulation, it is fairly easy to identify its "Eko~s", and
thereby, determine its specific meaning. The specific "teXo~s" of
the provision, must be regarded as integrated to with the gen-
eral "TsXo~s" of the regulation as a whole. The interpretation
becomes more difficult in the case of a Treaty provision which
falls within the general "teXo~s" of the Treaty or of the three
Treaties, as found in several judgments of the Courts.
Further, teleology provides a guide for the interpretation of
vague notions. Also where a lacuna is found within the written
law, teleology acts as a guide to fill that lacuna with reference to
the general principles of law. The case-law of the Court thus
24 EEC TREATY art. 164.
25 According to M. Hilf, The Role of Comparative Law in the Jurisprudence of
the C.J.E.C., LA LIMITATION DES Daorrs DE L'-IoMME EN Daorr CoNSTrrUTIONNEL
CoMPAR9 549 (1986) (Que.) 'The Court has a legal obligation to consider national
traditions and concepts." It bases that obligation on the principle of solidarity laid
down in Article 5 of the EEC Treaty and on the fact that European integration
cannot become a reality otherwise than in a "comparative atmosphere."
26 See also YoKARS, THE COMPARATIVE METHOD IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL
LAw AND IN EUOPEAN CoMMUNITY LAw 26 (1985) (Greek).
1994]
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brings about "harmonization" and may even act as a "replace-
ment" of national legislations.
To this end, the judges of the Court of Justice, setting aside
their personal beliefs, must arrive at criteria by reference to the
beliefs and common values of the people of Europe. This pro-
cess is comprised of two stages: first, the Court refers to the
legislation of the Member States in which those beliefs and con-
victions are reflected. If the first method does not bring results,
the Court then refers directly to the convictions, beliefs and
spiritual attitudes of the peoples of Europe.
The first stage is the legal application of the comparative
method. It is evident by observing the manner in which the
comparative method is utilized by the Court, that the Court
uses teleological interpretation. This method of interpretation
provides the means by which the Court is able to draw upon the
convictions, beliefs and spiritual attitudes of the people of Eu-
rope, since the materialization of those convictions and beliefs
in a particular way of life constitutes the aim pursued by the
three European Communities. 27 If the comparative approach is
unsuccessful, if no explicit rules exist on a particular issue in
the laws of the Member States, or if the rules which do exist are
inconsistent or contradictory, the Court must then refer directly
to those convictions and beliefs of the peoples of Europe.
From a cultural point of view, difficulties arise from the fact
that while the peoples of Europe share the same fundamental
conceptions about humanity, there are also differences which
mark the particular identity of each region. These differences
must be respected. This multi-cultural approach also imbues
the work of the Court. Each case requires the Court to identify
what constitutes the resultant vector of those differences, the
",reXo ", which will guide its decision. In this respect the Court
must act as though it were the consciousness of Europe.
The fact that the comparative method is used in conjunc-
tion with teleological interpretation explains why the Court
sometimes dismisses the rule of the common denominator and
adopts the rule most conducive to the ultimate objective of Com-
munity integration. This methodological approach by the Court
27 See BREDIMAS, Comparative Law, supra note 20, at n.73.
274 [Vol. 6:267
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has sometimes been criticized as being merely "empirical",28 be-
cause it does not always adopt the rules which are most widely
in force. The opposing view states that the comparative method
cannot be "static", and rather that it must include a teleological
element in the comparison. 29 The search for rules in force in
the Member States, as well as non-member countries, is cogni-
tive. However, in the case of lacunae, the choice of what must
be recognized as constituting the law in force in the Community
involves a creative element.
Both stages described above involve difficulties varying in
nature. The second stage involves the difficulties outlined
above, which are universally recognized. 30 The difficulties in-
herent in the previous stage, namely the "scientific-cognitive"
stage, are not always present. Nevertheless, they do exist, in so
far as the perception of the concepts and rules of another legal
system largely depends on the legal system from the standpoint
of the perceiver, "the subject of knowledge." By contrast with
the natural sciences, there is no common international legal ter-
minology, except to the extent to which some uniform law ap-
pears to exist.
3. Indicia of The Use of The Comparative Method In
Judgments
How can it be established that the solution adopted in a
judgment is the result of a prior comparative examination? Is it
possible to determine in which legal order the Court found a
given general principle?
The prior comparative examination is either expressly
mentioned in certain judgments or apparent from a clear com-
ponent of other judgments or, presumed from the Court's known
general attitude.
As a rule, the Court does not make detailed reference to
any comparative examination which preceded its judgment. An
exception to that rule is illustrated by the judgment in Case 7/
28 L.J. Constantinesco, Traitd de Droit Comparg, LA M1.THODE COMPARATIVE
355 (1974) (Fr). See also PESCATORE, supra note 2, at 353. SACHPEDIDOU, THE LIA-
BILITY OF THE E.E.C. BY VIRTUE OF LEGISLATIVE MEASURES 133, 136 nn.49-50
(1985).
29 DELIGIANNIS, supra note 16, at 32 n.92.
30 BREDHAS, Interpretation, supra note 20, at XV.
1994]
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56 Algera v. Assembly of the Europ. Coal & Steel Community,
1957 E.C.R. 39, [in particular pages 55 and 56, opinion at page
69, in particular, page 80)], where a classic form of comparative
examination is found on both the part of the Advocate General
and the Court.31 Not only is there usually no detailed reference,
but there is no reference at all. However, where an express ref-
erence is made, it is usually succinct,32 and only. in some cases
more extended references are given.33
Authors have attributed this silence or understatement in
judgments to various reasons, such as the difficulty in deter-
mining the rules in force in the various legal systems.34 How-
ever, it appears that the Court does not hesitate, where it is
necessary, to set out its comparative law findings.35 In certain
cases, a reference to comparative law in the decision is unneces-
sary because the comparative examination was not made in or-
der to choose between the varying legal systems' approaches;
but, rather to inform the Court about the political and sociologi-
cal implications that a potential judgment would have within
the Member States' legal systems.36 This attitude reflects the
Court's concern in respecting cultural differences.
Although a prior comparative examination often cannot be
inferred from the judgments, the following elements show that
the examination is almost never omitted.
31 See also Judgments in Case 155/78, Miss M v. Commission, 1980 E.C.R.
1797, para. 19; Case 811/79, Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v. Ariete,
1980 E.C.R. 2545, paras. 10-11; Case 826/79, Mireco v. Amministrazione delle
Finanze dello Stato, 1980 E.C.R. 2559, paras. 11-12; Case 155/79, AM & S Europe
v. Commission, 1982 E.C.R. 1575, paras. 18-21; Joined Cases 303 to 312/81, Kiock-
ner-Werke v. Commission, 1983 E.C.R. 1507, para. 45; Case 168/82, European
Coal & Steel Community v. Ferriere Sant'Anna Spa, 1983 E.C.R. 1681, para. 15;
Joined Cases 205 to 215/82, Deutsche Milchkontor v. FRG, 1983 E.C.R. 2633, para.
30; Case 374/87, Orkem v. Commission, 1989 E.C.R. 3283, para. 29. In the judg-
ment in Case 43/77, Industrial Diamond Supplies v. Riva, 1977 E.C.R. 2175, there
is a departure from national law.
32 E.g., judgments in Case 135/83, Abels v. Bestur van de bedrijfsvereniging,
1985 E.C.R. 469, paras. 15-17, and Joined Cases 205 to 215/82, Deutsche
Milchkontor, 1983 E.C.R. 2633.
33 Case 155/79, AM&S Europe v. Commission, 1982 E.C.R. 1575, paras. 18-21
& 26; Case 826/79, Mireco, 1980 E.C.R. 2259, paras. 10-16.
34 Deligiannis, supra note 16, at 24 n.60; Pescatore, supra note 2, at 346.
35 See generally cases cited supra notes 31, 32.
36 See Case 21/76, Handelskwekerij g.J. Bier v. Mines de Potasse d'Alsace,
1976 E.C.R. 1735, para. 23.
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol6/iss2/2
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The opinions of Advocates General often compare various
features of different national legislations and case-law, as well
as academic legal literature.3 7 Frequently, the Court asks for
its Research and Documentation Service to carry out a compar-
ative examination concerning the specific problems which arise
in a case. On other occasions, the Court asks the Commission3 8
as a party, or as amicus curiae in preliminary-ruling proceed-
ings, for information on the law in force in the Member States.
The parties, or amici curiae, also on some occasions, provide in-
formation on the law in force in various legal systems, particu-
larly on more general questions.3 9 However, even where such
information is not provided, the parties set out their views and
arguments in the context of the legal order of their own coun-
tries.40 Thus, they indirectly provide information on that legal
order.
The comparative method is underlying in all cases due to
each judge's different legal training, knowledge, approach and
reasoning4 ' which reflects the legal system of his country. The
deliberations are enriched by the diversity of the contributions
made by the judges. The Court's deliberations constitute a liv-
ing comparative law in action.
If these various factors are borne in mind, even in those
judgments where no specific mention is made of them, it is pos-
sible to perceive elements which are derived from comparative
law. For example, the principle of solidarity is embodied in Ar-
ticle 5 of the Treaty; however, the manner in which it is ex-
pounded in the case-law, particularly the case law saying that
the obligation of cooperation rests not only on the Member
37 The first cases in which the Advocate General made a comparative exami-
nation, and no express reference thereto was made in the judgement, include Case
14/61, Hoogovens v. High Authority of ECSC, 1962 E.C.R. 253; Case 13/61, Bosch,
1962 E.C.R. 45, Opinion at 56, 59- 1; and Case 90/74, Deboeck v. Commission of
European Communities, 1975 E.C.R. 1123, Opinion at 1138, 1141-42.
38 See Case 155/78, Miss M., 1980 E.C.R. 1797, para. 19.
39 E.g., Judgment in Case 108/81, Amylum v. Council of European Communi-
ties, 1982 E.C.R. 3107, 3113-3114. In the Judgment in Case 155/79, AM&S Eu-
rope, 1982 E.C.R. 1575, the Court reopened the oral procedure in order to obtain
further clarification on questions of comparative law.
40 Compare these views with those espoused by G. Benos, supra note 1.
41 For example, A Jurist's logical reasoning is deductive for those jurists from
the Continent and Scotland, and inductive for those jurists from England and
Ireland.
1994]
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States but also on the institutions of the Community vis-a-vis
the Member States, recalls the "Bundestreue" of the Federal
German State.42
Finally, it must be observed that is the term "comparative"
is construed very broadly will include every external influence.
For example, initially the presentation of judgments was close
to the German model. Later, it was modified in line with the
needs of the Court, but without ever going as far as the system
of "converging opinions", guarded by the House of Lords. 43
Moreover, the judges' method of interrupting oral argument by
asking questions did not emerge until after the accession of the
United Kingdom and Ireland.44
4. Other Observations
The foregoing observations have highlighted a number of
features of the Court's use of the comparative method. The fol-
lowing are additional observations.
The comparative method, which is currently used in the
field of private law, has been adopted by the Court in the fields
of administrative and constitutional law. 45 This method is not
carried out in a vacuum, that is to say for administrative issues,
a comparison of only the administrative laws of the member
States, and for civil issues, a comparison of only civil laws. This
result follows from the fact that the comparative method is used
for the teleological method and that the ultimate ",rseo s" is the
resultant vector of a multi-cultural collection of beliefs of the
peoples of Europe.
That is also the reason why the comparative examination
also extends to the unwritten rules forming a part of the various
legal systems. It is true that investigation into unwritten law is
not easy where an unwritten principle has not yet been recog-
nized in the case-law of the country concerned, and conse-
quently comparative examination is restricted in that aspect.
42 As pertinently observed by Thejmen Koopmans, The Birth of European Law
At the Crossroads of Legal Traditions, 39 AM. J. Comp. L. 493, 502 (1991).
43 This system is much more apparent in the U.S. Supreme Court.
" Previously, the Court had been described (in French) as "muette".
45 DELIGL4NIS, supra note 16, at 34; Pescatore, supra note 2, at 359.
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The Court has on several occasions noted the independence
of Community law from the laws of the Member States.46 At
first glance, it seems paradoxical that the Court should use the
comparative method, by referring to national laws, with a view
to then interpreting Community law in an independent man-
ner. However, such recourse to national laws, for the sake of
information, does not amount to a negation of independence. It
merely means that the comparative method underpins the tele-
ological method of interpretation.
That is why the Court does not limit the comparative
method to the laws of the Member States. However, when it
compares only the Member States' laws, it does not consider it-
self bound by the result of its comparative examination, even
where a uniform law exists in all the Member States.47 Since it
is merely obtaining information, the Court may adopt a solution
which is neither the highest common denominator, nor one of
the solutions adopted in the law of one of the Member States.
The Court has never admitted that its decisions are the re-
sult of a comparative examination constituting the legal basis
for a rule or an unwritten principle to be in force; their legal
basis resides in the fact that they constitute general principles
of law. For example, the Court has not taken as the legal basis
for the principle of the protection of human rights the minimal
protection common to the constitutions of the Member States.
The Court was only "inspired"48 by the constitutional traditions
common to the Member States, which allowed it to find that the
rules on the protection of human rights form an integral part of
the community legal order.
Applying the principle that the most appropriate rule for
the Community must be sought, the Court accepts the common
denominator in certain judgments. In some other judgments
46 One of the consequences of this independence is to be found in that the
national courts, applying Community law, for example a regulation, are not enti-
tled to supply lacunae in such law by reference to national law. Judgement in
Case 159/73, Hannoversche Zucker v. Hauptzollant Hannover, 1974 E.C.R. 212,
para. 4.
47 Contra Pescatore, supra note 2, at 35.
4 Judgments in Case 11/70, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft Mhb v.
Einfuhr, 1970 E.C.R. 1125, para. 4; Case 4/73, Nold v. Ruhrkohle Aktiengesell-
schaft, 1974 E.C.R. 491, paras. 13-14; and Case 44/79, Hauer v. Land Rheinland-
Pfalz, 1979 E.C.R. 3727, paras. 15, 20 & 22.
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the Court prefers a solution based on national law, while in
others it may take no account of national law49 or completely
distance itself from all national solutions. For example, with
respect to the important questions of what consequences flow
from the annulment of a provision which breaches the principle
of equal treatment, the comparative method had shown that in
the Member States it was considered that the annulment cre-
ated a legal void which only the legislature was empowered to
fill. Nevertheless, the Court followed a different course: it has
stated that until such time as the legislature has adopted new
rules, the provision most favorable for one category of persons is
applicable also to the victims of discriminatory treatment.50
In certain cases, the result of the comparative examination
was unusual. In one case, the court decided that the protection
of a right based on Community law did not require a uniform
rule common to the Member States and, despite the divergence
between the laws of the Member States, it held that it was in-
cumbent upon the Member States to regulate the recovery of
national taxes collected in breach of Community law.51 In an-
other case, the divergence found to exist was a decisive argu-
ment for concluding that there was no lacuna in a directive. 52
D. Comparison Not Expressly Provided For - The Brussels
Convention
Article 5 of the Protocol, which provides that the Court has
jurisdiction to interpret the Convention, 53 does not mention the
comparative method. However, where the Court applies the
49 Judgment in Joined Cases 44, 46 and 49/74, Acton and Others v. Commis-
sion, 1975 E.C.R. 383, paras. 15-16.
50 For example, the judgments in Joined Cases 75 and 117/82, Razzouk and
Beydoun v. Commission of the European Communities, 1984 E.C.R. 1509; Case
71/85, Netherlands v. F.N.V., 1986 E.C.R. 3855; Case 286/85, McDermott and Cot-
ter v. Minister for Social Welfare and the Attorney General, 1987 E.C.R. 1453;
Case C/262/88, Barber v. Guardian Royal Exchange Assurance Group, 1990 E.C.R.
1-1889. See also Y. Gamot, Rflexions Sur Le Recours au Droit Comparg par la
C.J.C.E., REVUE FRANCAISE DE DROIT ADMINISTRATIF [R. FR. D. ADMIN.] 255 (1990).
51 Judgment in Case 826/79, Mireco, 1980 E.C.R. 2559, paras. 10-11.
52 Case 135/83, Abels v. Bestuur Van de Bedrijfsvereniging, 1985 E.C.R. 469,
at para. 17 states, "It may be concluded that if the directive had been intended to
apply also to transfers of undertakings in the context of such proceedings, an ex-
press provision would have been included for that purpose."
53 See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
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Brussels Convention, it necessarily carries out a comparative
examination since the terminology of the Convention is based
on that of the national laws, even if the aim is to define a con-
cept of the Convention, which in principle is autonomous from
often divergent meanings which the same term has in various
national laws.
Where the Court finds that a term used in a provision of the
Treaty, of secondary law or of the Brussels Convention has an
autonomous meaning, it concludes that the provision does not
refer to each national law for the meaning of that term. Rather,
the Court determines the term's specific meaning to be the
same throughout the Member States, but not necessarily differ-
ent and wholly distinct from the meaning which it has in all
national systems of laws.54
E. Classifications
While it is not the aim of the present article to list or cate-
gorize the judgments of the Court in regard to the use of the
comparative method, the foregoing observations on its judg-
ments show that various classifications are possible on the basis
of a number of criteria:
- Judgments concerning general principles and those con-
cerning the interpretation of specific provisions.
- Judgments which limit the comparative method to the
laws of the Member States and judgments which also ex-
54 In its judgment in Case 29/76, Lufttransportunternehmen Gmbh and Co.
Kg v. Eurocontrol, 1976 E.C.R. 1541, para. 3, the Court states: "The concept in
question civil and commercial matters) must therefore be regarded as independent
and must be interpreted by reference, first, to the objectives and scheme of the
Convention and, secondly, to the general principles which stem from the corpus of
the national legal systems.' See also judgments in Case 43/77, Industrial Diamond
Supplies v. Luigi Riva, 1977 E.C.R. 2175, paras. 22-24; Case 133/78, Gourdain v.
Franz Nadler, 1979 E.C.R. 733, para. 3; Case 150/77, Bertrand v. Paul Ott Kg,
1978 E.C.R. 1431, paras. 19-20; Case C-26/91, Handte v. Traitements Mecano-
Chimiques des Surfaces, 1992 E.C.R. 1-3967, para. 20. The judgment in Case 34/
82, Peters v. Zuid Nederlandse Aannemers, 1983 E.C.R. 987, para. 14, adds a fur-
ther argument based on the practicability of the interpretation adopted.
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amine the laws of non-member countries5 5 or international
law.56
- Judgments which apply57 and judgments which ignore the
common denominator.
- Judgments which generally or specifically mention the
comparative method.58
III. CONCLUSION
European integration is achieved by secondary legislation
(secondary community law), in particular by regulations and di-
rectives, which are substituted for, or bring about the harmoni-
zation of, the legislations of the Member States. Comparative
scrutiny of the legislation of the Member States is preliminary
to the adoption of Community measures, particularly in the
case of directives, for which comparative information is
essential.
There exists "quasi-harmonization", which is brought about
by the case-law of the Court of Justice. This "quasi-harmoniza-
tion" also requires comparative research into the legislation of
the Member States. Comparative examination has a specific
55 Judgment in Case 48/69, Imperial Chemical Industries Ltd. v. Commission
of the European Communities, 1972 E.C.R. 619, in which United States legislation
is considered in the Opinion of the advocate general; judgments in Joined Cases 17
and 20/61, Klochner-Werke v. High Authority, 1962 E.C.R. 325; Case 6/72,
Europemballage Corporation and Continental Can Company Inc. v. Commission of
the European Communities, 1973 E.C.R. 215; Case 24/71, Meinhardt v. Commis-
sion of the European Communities, 1972 E.C.R. 269, para. 6; Case 17/74, Trans-
ocean Marine Paint Ass'n v. Commission, 1974 E.C.R. 1063; Case 108/63, Merlini
v. High Authority of the ECSC, 1965 E.C.R. 1. The English law principle of estop-
pel was recognized before the accession of the United Kingdom to the community.
The case law which upholds the "limited" direct effect of directives is in fact based
on this principle, although that fact is not expressly stated.
56 See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
57 See supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text.
58 Examples of general terms:
a. Elementary principles of law. Judgments in Case 32/62, Alvis v. Council
of the EEC, 1963 E.C.R. 49; and Joined Cases 42 and 49/59, Snupat v. High
Authority, 1961 E.C.R. 145;
b. General principles of labour law. Judgments in Case 18/74, Syndicat Gen-
eral du Personnel v. Comm'n, 1974 E.C.R. 933, para. 10; and Case 175/73
Union Syndicale v. Council of the EC, 1974 E.C.R. 917, para. 14;
c. General principles even in the absence of provisions. Judgment in Joined
Cases 3-18, 25 and 26/58, Erzbergbau and Others v. High Authority, 1960
E.C.R. 173.
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function in the activities of the Court which gives rise to the
particular features of the way in which the method is applied.
Tangentially, the relationship between the Court and na-
tional legal systems is not a one-way relationship. The Court is
inspired by national laws, while national laws are influenced by
Community law. Moreover, national legislatures take account
of the fact that national laws are inserted in the framework of
the Community's legal system, which is a quasi-federal system.
In turn, national administrations and national courts interpret
national law in the light of Community law.59
National courts, bound by the decisions made by the Court
of Justice, apply in cases governed by Community law princi-
ples which are unknown to national law for example, the princi-
ple of proportionality, are made familiar with those principles.
This familiarization leads to the application, by osmosis of those
principles, such as that of proportionality, on the part of the na-
tional courts in cases which are governed by national law. This
is a further sign of the interpenetration which both results from
and participates in the movement towards European
integration.
59 They are also under a legal obligation to do so, as the Court has held in the
Judgments in Case 103/88, Fratelli Costanzo v. Comune di Milano, 1989 E.C.R
1839, paras. 28-33; Case 14/83, Von Colson and Kamann v. Land Nordrhein-West-
falen, 1984 E.C.R. 1891, para. 26; and Case C-106/89, Marleasing v. Comercial
Internacional De Alimentacion sa, 1990 E.C.R. 1-4135, para. 8.
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